And Secretary Bloomfield and I have done these consultations and will be happy to talk to the committee about the reactions that we have gotten and answer any specific questions.

And in conclusion, I would like to thank this committee for the consistent leadership and support that you have shown, the support for our troops, the support for the defense transformation that we are trying to bring about within the Defense Department. And I look forward to our discussion this morning.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Feith can be found in the

Appendix on page 116.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

And Mr. Bloomfield, Secretary Bloomfield, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DE-PARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary BLOOMFIELD. Thank you very much, Chairman Hunter. As a latecomer to this morning's hearing, I don't have a formal statement for the record, but I would like to say a few opening words on the political side.

First of all, it is a great honor for me to come before the House Armed Services Committee and you, sir, and I thank you for the opportunity. I just have three comments that are of a political na-

ture

The first is that it has been a burden, if you will, on the Administration, as we have talked about this very significant undertaking, to make sure that the rest of the world understands that the commitments that the United States has undertaken over many years, commitments which are going to be expanding as we see at the Istanbul summit next week, treaty alliances that were referenced by Congressman Skelton, are part and parcel and fundamental to this global defense posture review. The United States is making it more possible in the 21st century to leave no doubt that we stand behind all of our security commitments around the world, the security of Europe, the security of Northeast Asia, the security of Southeast Asia and Pacific Rim and all of the treaty alliance commitments that the United States has taken as a solemn commitment. This will improve our capacity to ensure that there is no doubt among adversaries and those who will test our will that we have the capacity to meet the national security challenges of the 21st century.

The second point has to do with military transformation, something that, as a civilian who sits at the State Department, I am not qualified to talk about, but I am an admirer of the process that the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has undertaken over a period of time, and it is clear to me that, as we adjust and restructure our assets and infrastructure and forces and learn the lessons of recent engagements so as to be much more agile and to be able to respond to the unexpected in an effective and decisive way, you can see the military time lines are closing and I think there is a political dimension to this. It would make no sense to posture our forces to be able to close on a crisis in a very short time line if the political process that enabled them to

move had a very long time line. Under Secretary Feith alluded to that.

There is a political transformation that I see in this process, one where we do need to engage our security partners around the world, explain to them the logic of our thinking, explain to them the threat as we understand it in the 21st century and help them to undergo their own reviews of security and encourage them to align their security policies in much the same way as we are aligning our own. I believe the diplomatic side of the U.S. Government has a task, which is to engender a common view of the national security among our friends and allies. I think there is a strong bedrock of a common view. Part of this consultative process is to explain our new thinking at the political level as well as at the military and national security level.

The third point I would like to make is, if I may, to echo the tribute that Congressman Skelton made to Secretary Rumsfeld. As one who worked many years in the Pentagon myself, I recognize what a major undertaking this is and one that deserves, I think, anyone's admiration. And I think the Congress plays a fundamental role in any steps that are going to be taken. This is setting the stage for many, many years to come, and it is not something that

resides solely in the executive branch.

I simply want to make the point as a foreign policy matter, that the example that the United States sets by having the ability to make these major management adjustments, to make the military changes, to undergo the top-to-bottom U.S. and overseas comprehensive analysis and work our way through it, the capacity to undertake this global defense posture review sets an example that I think will reward us in other countries. I have heard personally in at least three capitals where other governments are undergoing the same kind of analysis and they are restructuring their own forces. They are closing some unneeded facilities. They are consolidating units. They are developing future-oriented niche capabilities. All of this adds to our international security if it is done in a cooperative way.

And so I commend—I simply want to say that, as we proceed with this, I think we will set an example that will enhance other U.S. foreign policy goals, including burden-sharing, including having other governments more ready, more thoughtful about the evolving threat and the need to be ready to respond and to respond in concert, hopefully, with the United States when the phone rings

and when the President decides we must act.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN, Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

I understand, General Cartwright, you have a brief statement. And Secretary DuBois, you basically are standing ready for questions?

Secretary DuBois, Roger.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you for being with us.

arity with the other forces and regional conditions that are advan-

tageous to military operations.

There are quite a few national security and specifically military reasons why having a forward presence, to some extent, benefits the United States. What we are doing is, we are looking at balancing lots of factors in coming up with a force posture that has, we hope, the right number of forces deployed in the right places with the right kinds of facilities and, as I said, the right kinds of activities and relationships and legal relationships with our foreign partners.

I would invite Secretary Bloomfield or Ray DuBois to add any-

thing to address other points which you have mentioned.

Secretary Bloomfield. Congressman Bartlett, I can see from this discussion the committee has a very important interest in knowing the nexus between this current force posture consultation on the one hand and the very important BRAC process. While it is not the State Department's business, I think I can shed a little more light and perhaps take some of the responsibility for a little bit of the slowness in bringing forward the information you are requesting.

When the Administration set forward on the current set of consultations that were launched by the White House announcement of November 25 last year, and followed by several rounds of overseas discussions, it was understood throughout the Administration that this would not be an act where the United States made all of the decisions and simply told governments, like it or not, here is what we are going to do. We would treat them like the allies they

are. I am sure your comments also echo that spirit.

We are engaged in real consultations, and we have made clear overseas, including last week in several capitals with several on my part and several of Secretary Feith's colleagues, that no decisions have been taken by the President. That is a real commitment.

We are currently in the phase of receiving some feedback to specific ideas, so they see some points on their map and they under-

stand there are some local impacts.

Those governments are facing their press and their parliaments, and we need to show a little sensitivity. That is why we are not in a position in this forum to either say the gavel has pounded and here is a number, this is exactly what is going to happen. We need to show that consideration, and it is our job to get those consultations finished in a very timely manner so as not to compromise the very important deliberations that you are going to undertake. That is our commitment.

One other point: it is clear that many U.S. forces are based in the United States and others will be based in the United States and that they will be able to go further and faster than ever before. But even when something occurs, such as the Afghanistan contingency in 2001, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, we at the State Department had to work closely with the Pentagon to obtain political clearance for overflight, basing, access, beddown, and we did that in literally dozens of countries.

I am pleased to answer in my regions of the country, the answer was, yes, even though some of them wanted us to keep it quiet, we had very good response around the world. Even if all of our forces

were CONUS-based or on U.S. territory, we would have to have political consent of these sovereign countries to be able to overfly their territory and use their bases to get to wherever the contin-

gency was.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I understand the importance of the political statement we make by having our troops forward deployed, but I am wondering if those political goals couldn't just as well be achieved by the joint exercises that the Secretary talked about. I am not sure that we have to have large numbers of our troops, thousands and thousands of them, and their families further deployed. We might make that same political statement by an increased number of joint exercises with allies.

Secretary FEITH. Mr. Bartlett, we have thought about that, and one of the things that you will see is, in general, there will be a lighter U.S. footprint around the world as a result of this realignment; and we do believe that many of the important benefits that we can get out of forward deployment, we can get with rotational

forces. It is a point that we understand.

We do not think that it is prudent to dispense entirely with forces permanently stationed abroad, but we do think there is something to be said about lightening our footprint. In some cases, it will greatly improve our relationships with the host countries if we do lighten the footprint and we can remove the kinds of irritations that a heavy footprint brings.

Mr. HEFLEY, Thank you.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Secretary Bloomfield, this is going to be kind of a lengthy question, but at the Singapore defense conference, Secretary Rumsfeld held a press conference and one of the questions that he was asked by a reporter from Australia, named Ross Babbage, was this question:

"Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in your presentation on the campaign against global terrorism the importance of preventing a new generation of recruits flowing to the terrorist cause. I wonder if you are satisfied with the strategy to defeat national terrorism. Is it,

in fact, sufficiently coordinated to win?

In particular, are you satisfied that the Coalition's political warfare operations have gained sufficient traction to prevent new recruits from signing up for the terrorist cause? And I should have

mentioned, this was June 5 of this year in Singapore.

Secretary Rumsfeld's fairly lengthy answer which I have taken several paragraphs from, "I am certain we have not been successful. If the schools that are teaching young folks are teaching them terrorism and suicide bombing and hatred instead of mathematics or science or language, or things that can help them become productive members of society, we have a problem, the world has a problem; and it is quite clear to me we do not have a coherent approach to this."

Secretary Rumsfeld goes on, "President Sharon, in my view, has stepped forward. He has opposed terror, and he is actively trying to be active in the Global War on Terror, and yet simultaneously, in that part of the world we see more terrorists being trained. It is something that is going to take cooperation, and I don't frankly see a coalition that is organized to do it, whether reluctantly or So it certainly is an important part of our thinking when we are talking about where we want to be positioned around the world.

Secretary BLOOMFIELD. By the time this threat reaches our shores or attacks American interests outside our shores, it becomes the Pentagon's burden and the Department of Homeland Security's burden. Needless to say, they have contributed to the President's review of the entire national security strategy that was done after 9/11. There is a longer-term aspect to this, where is the recruitment pool coming from and why is this young generation listening to the appeal of extremism, and that places a burden on the rest of our foreign policy and the tools of our engagement to show that the American people care about the rest of the world.

The world is a lot more democratic and the media has proliferated a lot more than there used to be. We are more visible to millions of people in developing countries. It is incumbent upon us to realize that they are there, that their hearts and minds matter, that if they are very negative on the United States' role in the world, that may affect how senior leaders in their countries react when we ask them for overflight and access and basing, or for cooperation on financial flows of terror money or law enforcement or

intelligence cooperation.

Our foreign policy generally is better served when we articulate our goals in a way that resonates with other people around the world, where they see that American security is not inconsistent with their own sense of security; and that is a burden on us full time. And I think we have to—with our economic programs, with our assistance, our development programs, we have to show that we care about the rest of the world and we have to win this battle for the hearts and minds.

So there is a spectrum of engagement, and where this ties into the global defense posture review and why certainly I believe and, I think, Secretary Powell strongly believes that part of that posture is an investment in working side by side with security partners around the world and for all of the benefits that Secretary Feith just mentioned in terms of mentoring and transitioning and doing

transformation activities side by side.

But I think the American soldier is as good an ambassador as any American. They are an honest and friendly face which clearly wants nothing in return except to cooperate and advance larger goals of helping people wherever they are stationed. I think this is a very important contributor to our future approach, if you will, to reducing the appeal of extremism to this new generation around the world.

Mr. Hefley, Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Feith, I do think that the topic you were just discussing with Dr. Snyder deserves a great deal more attention and collaboration between the Administration and Congress, including questions whether our government is even structured or organized to deal with this war for the hearts and minds, or war of ideas, as some have described it.

I think there are many, many more questions than there are answers, and yet success, how we measure success, but some sort of success in that area is in some ways more important than the mili-

tary aspects of what we are doing in the war on terror. It kind of leads into this global posture review, which I am not clear about. That is one factor you just elaborated, how it contributes.

When Chairman Hunter asked about lift, that figures in. We have the Army restructuring itself in different size blocks, we have all of these numerous factors going on; and in a way, this is kind of like a broad-based, endless study, or it could be, of American national security.

The challenge is when to close the book and reach some decision points, it seems to me. When you do have something that comes to us, is it going to be a specific sort of thing, we need a base here

and here and this many people here?

The other extreme is some sort of guidance to influence things. You both talked about treaties. Are those legal arrangements which are signed, sealed and delivered, or are they goals? How specific and how definitive is it going to be?

Secretary Feith. That is a very good question.

The answer is not simple because much of what we need to do around the world for the realignment involves the consent of host nations. Now, not everything, if we want to pull forces back to the United States, clearly we do not need anybody's permission there. But even when it comes to pulling forces back to the United States, there are interests that we have in working out arrangements with the host countries to make sure that we take care of the legal effects, and we do it in an orderly fashion.

But when we are talking about creating new facilities or even increasing specific activities, schedules of combined exercises, for example, those are things that need to be worked out with the con-

sent of other countries.

I really appreciate the opportunity to explain this process, because it is not widely understood, and many of the newspaper accounts that we have read reflect misunderstandings on the point.

What we have is a process that is based on an analysis that has been under way for many months in the Pentagon about how we would like to be postured. On the basis of that analysis, we have gone out and we—launched late last calendar year, we launched a number of consultations in Congress and abroad, floating the broader concepts that I outlined in my opening statement that were guiding our thinking on the realignment.

We have since—partly on the basis of the input we got from those consultations, we have since refined our thinking and carried our analysis forward where we have specific ideas, including specific ideas about which units we might want to move where and which facilities we might want to put in different places. We are now at the point where, within a few weeks, we believe the Secretary will be able to go with a package of fairly specific ideas to the President.

As I said, when it comes to the gross numbers of how many forces we expect to bring back to the United States, we think our analysis is pretty far along on that, and we will be able to report that in July, as I mentioned, to the Congress.

With respect to a number of other ideas we have when we are talking about creating a new training facility in a particular country, for example, those ideas are going to be presented to the Presi-