

The Strategic Landscape in U.S.-Japanese Relations

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Thank you and good afternoon. My thanks to Mr. Sugita and Nikkei for their hospitality and for the honor of being with you today.

In a few minutes, you will hear a range of comments on security challenges facing the United States and Japan, from a panel of distinguished U.S. and Japanese colleagues. Today I would like to describe this strategic landscape, looking back over the past four years and offering a perspective on priority areas of effort under the second Bush Administration.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 caused the United States to make some rapid shifts in its management of foreign and security policy. U.S. territory was clearly seen as a theater of war by our enemies, the terrorists.

The likelihood of sudden and unanticipated attacks forced the U.S. to examine how quickly the democratic processes in Washington and allied capitals can make a decision to authorize force.

The nature of terrorists as non-state actors blending into the population at large and moving freely around the globe compelled the U.S. to reach out to almost every government in the world for intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. In many cases we requested basing access for U.S. and other forces operating in Afghanistan and later Iraq.

All of these adjustments in our international cooperation were made quickly. As many of us in Washington were busy arranging for a response to the 9/11 attacks, I think we realized that we were leaving one era of national security policy and entering another.

Three years later, we are still managing the beginning phase of this historic evolution from the Cold War to the Global War on Terrorism. I say this for a number of reasons:

- The new government and military institutions, including the Department of Homeland Security, the White House's Homeland Security Council, and the Pentagon's Northern Command in Colorado Springs, are all still establishing their roles in the wider bureaucracy. Their influence will grow over time.
- The 20th century alliance and basing arrangements in Europe and Asia are undergoing intensive review under the U.S. Global Defense Posture Initiative. A key purpose of this adjustment in our long-term basing strategy is to ensure that precious U.S. military resources, or those of our security partners, will be available, even on very short notice, to take effective action if our intelligence detects an illicit shipment of weapons of mass destruction or an imminent terrorist attack anywhere in the world.
- And, just as our military establishment has been studying the lessons of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, so has the U.S. intelligence community undergone rigorous examination by the Congress and the independent "9/11 Commission." Changes are underway in our intelligence establishment, and the final shape of these changes is not yet clear.
- I would also contrast the new U.S. pattern of international cooperation against terrorism, embracing perhaps 170 countries, to the situation a decade ago. At that time, the U.S. was far more likely to cut off official cooperation with countries whenever we disapproved of their behavior on such issues as human rights, nuclear proliferation, and support for America's adversaries in the world.

We still care a great deal about these policy concerns – and we use carrots and sticks to exert leverage on the behavior of other states. But defending ourselves and others against international terrorist threats means we must cooperate actively with other governments to track suspected terrorist individuals as they travel, and to locate and freeze their financial assets.

So America's foreign relations have changed since 9/11, and become more complicated, with positive layers of engagement and cooperation often co-existing with serious policy disagreements in the same bilateral relationship.

While America's international security role has been transforming, some other countries have seized the opportunity to participate in the response to the terrorist threat, and in the process have advanced their own military reforms. We see this, for example, with many newly admitted NATO countries that have committed troops to the coalition in Iraq.

All these changes have, perhaps, been less welcome in some other countries, which preferred the established patterns and process of security cooperation in place before 9/11, for a variety of reasons. And so change in our security has not been universally welcomed around the world, even among some longtime allies.

That is why, as U.S. officials look around the world, we have to take into account historic trends shaping the perceptions of peoples and their leaders in other regions:

- In our own western hemisphere, we have witnessed a dramatic shift from dictatorship to democracy, a sharp reduction in the size of military forces and a new focus on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, reflected by the many states that have responded positively to the call for stability forces in Haiti. This is a very positive story.
- In Europe, America's traditional allies are in the midst of an historic process of political, legal and economic integration within the European Union. In my view, the crisis of 9/11 produced divergent priorities between Washington and some European capitals. The split over Iraq policy was serious; but the long-term reality is that Europe and America continue to have far more to gain by cooperation than by competition.
- In the Middle East, there is turbulence and uncertainty. Decades of *status quo* marked by absence of political participation, mediocre governance, misappropriation of oil wealth, and unresolved political conflicts have bred a high and growing level of popular resentment – the only question being whom to blame.

This resentment is the dry tinder that is feeding the wildfire of violence and terror – a fire that has now spread to Southeast Asia.

Three years after 9/11, there are major changes in the security landscape, some but not all of them due to military action. The Taliban is gone from Kabul; the Saddam Hussein dictatorship in Baghdad is no more; and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat has passed from the scene.

In Afghanistan, Iraq and the Palestinian community, legitimate democratic processes now hold the key to the future of their peoples. In Morocco last week, states from across the Middle East met and talked about the one remedy that can stop the spread of instability – namely, greater political and economic freedom.

- In South Asia, Washington has important new relationships with both Pakistan and India. These two nuclear states need the world's encouragement to build on positive bilateral steps the two have taken to defuse mistrust and reduce the prospect for miscalculation, escalation and hostilities.
- When we turn to other major powers, there is much one could say about Russia, and perhaps even more about China. In both cases, however, it is fair to say that the U.S. shares with others a responsibility to encourage both Russia and China to evolve in directions compatible with international peace and respect for individual rights embodied in the rule of law.

Completing this worldwide review of strategic trends by focusing on Northeast Asia and U.S.-Japan relations specifically, I would say that Americans have to be impressed by the way this vital alliance relationship, which has kept the peace in Northeast Asia for two generations, has adapted to ensure our security in the 21st century. At a time when some other regional security strategies are still being debated among America's allies, we find that the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and the bilateral relationship as a whole, is in excellent shape.

The Japanese Government deserves much credit for recognizing the longer-term implications of the Global War on Terrorism very early on, and acting in its own national interest to contribute substantially to activities that really matter: deterring North Korea, rebuilding Afghanistan to be peaceful and self-sustaining, and providing essential economic and humanitarian support for the Iraqi people, giving them a chance to determine their own future. These are all very

strategically important investments by Japan.

Closer to home, Japan's willingness to examine appropriate adjustments in its export regulations to ensure the success of defense industrial cooperation – notably in the area of missile defense – is another sign that there is a steady, purposeful dimension to Japan's foreign and security policy today that reflects an understanding of larger international interests – interests that I believe will affect Japan's future security and prosperity.

I see a clear convergence of priorities between the Bush Administration and Prime Minister Koizumi's government looking forward:

- Both place importance on political solutions to the major security problems, from Six-Party Talks with North Korea to the Israel-Palestinian roadmap, to the electoral processes planned for Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005.
- The U.S. and Japan both understand the burdens of a world where so many crises place high demands on U.S. forces and economic support from both governments. Tokyo and Washington share an interest in reducing the number and scope of these crisis situations through political and economic measures.
- As we work together on military transformation, our Japanese allies can be assured that America's global defense posture adjustments, which have been a topic of much speculation here in light of anticipated force reductions in some other countries, will continue to make Japan's security a cornerstone of our Pacific posture.

So there is a very solid foundation for bilateral cooperation throughout the world.

With so many pressing issues to address, the U.S. cannot help but recognize and acknowledge with appreciation that Japan has adapted its own role in the international arena to carry a larger share of the burden in bending international trends toward a stable and prosperous environment conducive to democracy and economic freedom.

I think what is notable about Japan's evolution is that it goes beyond Japan's longstanding record of generous humanitarian assistance, and represents more than the familiar strategies of building important economic ties with ODA projects.

Japan's leaders have grasped the new strategic reality that the path to its own economic security goes through political and security channels as well.

Japan's military presence in Iraq, its leadership among donor nations aiding Iraq and Afghanistan, its commitment to play a key role in missile defense, and its continued strong support for the U.S.-Japan alliance through the national defense program guidelines, all send a hugely important message to those who promote Islamic extremism or believe they can benefit from nuclear and missile proliferation.

They can see that Japan pays close heed to its own security interests, and stands firmly with the world community in the noble protection of innocent people whose very future is under assault every day by radical terrorists.

I will close by suggesting some strategic points of focus for Japan's consideration in the coming years:

- First, I believe we all have to start with the global challenge posed by extremism in the Arab and Islamic world. This transnational epidemic has many causes – some political, some economic, some psychological.

The single most important element of a successful campaign to calm the contagion of extremism will be solidarity among the nations of the world in their responses to this problem.

Moderate and reform-minded Muslims must have strong, unwavering support from every quarter of the international community if they are to go into the mosque and confront these radicals who have brought such controversy to their religion and such harm to the lives of innocent people everywhere. This is not just America's issue: it is everyone's issue, including Japan's.

- The second point of focus is one that Japan has largely incorporated into its foreign policy – a solid stand against proliferation of WMD and missiles, with an emphasis on nuclear proliferation.

Japan's support for missile defense, the Proliferation Security Initiative and a nuclear-free Korean peninsula have set a worthy example for other states in Asia and around the world.

At a time when North Korea is testing the boundaries of international norms against developing a nuclear weapons and delivery capability, so is Iran.

I think it important to point out that the very consequences that Japan would find unacceptable in a nuclear-

armed North Korea are the same consequences that Iran's neighbors from Central Asia to the Caucasus to the Arabian Peninsula would face if Iran's nuclear ambitions are not similarly ended.

Japan has in recent years resumed a project-related assistance relationship with Iran, and Japan's pursuit of access to petroleum sources is understood. But the larger strategic equity, even for Japan, lies with the effort to persuade Iran to make the right choice for its own future, and terminate its reprocessing and enrichment activities permanently.

- A third potential strategic point of focus for Japan is the issue of energy. We have seen that China's demand for imported oil has been rising sharply, and uncertainty in many oil-producing areas from Latin America and West Africa to the Middle East has added pressures that contributed to extraordinarily high oil prices this past year. Suddenly, energy is once again an important factor among international security concerns.

In a sense, having enough prosperity to be able to afford high-energy import costs is Japan's best defense against the high oil prices. But let us now recognize that the OPEC cartel which exerted such pressure on the global economy in the 1970s is now tightening the world supply of oil, even though the current price is almost twice as high as OPEC's declared target price range.

While I do not have a specific proposal, I think the past year has reminded us that major sellers of oil are acting out of very narrow self-interest, and not at all with larger international equities at heart. Consuming countries such as Japan and the United States and many others should be asking what lessons to draw from this situation as we ponder the commitments and sacrifices of blood and treasure so many oil importing countries are making in the interest of international stability.

This menu of issues for Japan's consideration has a common theme. I wish to encourage Japan to build on the positive track it is already pursuing; to ensure its long-term security by taking fuller account of trends and problems elsewhere that may have an impact on Japan's well-being.

We have an enormous amount of work to do bilaterally to ensure the long-term success of the U.S.-Japan security relationship in all respects, including basing issues, command structure, military-to-military engagement activities, and cooperative defense industrial projects. Japan is moving in the right direction, and I am optimistic about the continued health and success of this alliance in maintaining security for Japan as both countries contribute to achieving peace elsewhere.

My optimism is grounded in a recognition that Japan has truly opened its eyes to security challenges on a wider scale, and increasingly is living up to its potential as a strategic partner and a worthy example to the nations of the world.

Thank you.