

THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND



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**SECURITY ASSISTANCE
CONFERENCE**

POST CONFERENCE REPORT

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BEFORE THE

U.S. COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC
SECURITY ASSISTANCE CONFERENCE

HONOLULU, HAWAII

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"U.S. DEFENSE DIPLOMACY: A MISSION IN NEED OF A MANDATE"

GENERAL BROWN, ADMIRAL TONEY, DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES, FRIENDS -- THANK YOU VERY MUCH, AND GOOD MORNING. ADMIRAL HARDISTY HAS DONE ME A GREAT HONOR BY INVITING ME TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 1989 PACIFIC COMMAND SECURITY ASSISTANCE CONFERENCE, AND TO HELP KICK OFF THE PROCEEDINGS WITH SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE WASHINGTON POLICY LANDSCAPE.

I TAKE GREAT COMFORT FROM THE FACT THAT NO MATTER WHAT I SAY HERE THIS MORNING ABOUT OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, THE RECORD WILL IMMEDIATELY BE SET STRAIGHT BY MY FRIEND AND COLLEAGUE LTG CHARLES BROWN, WHOM YOU WILL HEAR FROM NEXT. ONE OF THE TRUE PRIVILEGES OF MY PRESENT SERVICE IN THE PENTAGON IS TO HAVE A FRONT-ROW SEAT OBSERVING THIS MAN AS HE COMBINES AN ABUNDANCE OF INTEGRITY, LEADERSHIP, MANAGERIAL TALENT AND JUST PLAIN SMARTS IN RUNNING THE DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY. I CAN REPORT TO YOU THAT THE MORALE THROUGHOUT THE RANKS IN DSAA IS VERY HIGH TODAY, AND THAT IS SURELY THE ULTIMATE TRIBUTE TO THEIR DIRECTOR.

IN A WAY, THIS MAY BE AN INOPPORTUNE TIME FOR ME TO COMMENT ON POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE 1990s. OUR NEW BOSS, SECRETARY CHENEY, IS PUTTING HIS LEADERSHIP TEAM IN PLACE AND FORMULATING HIS DEFENSE PRIORITIES. PRESIDENT BUSH HAS TASKED A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY REVIEW COVERING SEVERAL AREAS, INCLUDING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY. I HAVE BEEN RATHER

HEAVILY INVOLVED IN THAT PROCESS, AND I CAN TELL YOU THAT THIS IS NOT AN IDLE EXERCISE. SENIOR POLICY LEVELS THROUGHOUT THE PENTAGON AND THE INTERAGENCY ARENA HAVE SPENT LONG HOURS CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO, TRYING TO OFFER THE PRESIDENT MEANINGFUL INSIGHTS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF WORLD TRENDS ON U.S. INTERESTS, AND THE BEST WAY TO GO ABOUT PRESERVING THOSE INTERESTS. IT IS A FASCINATING PROCESS AND, I AM CONVINCED, A WORTHWHILE INVESTMENT OF TIME AND ENERGY.

OBVIOUSLY, UNTIL THE REVIEW IS COMPLETE AND THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE SOME KEY DECISIONS, IT WILL BE PREMATURE FOR ME OR ANYONE ELSE TO ARTICULATE AN AUTHORITATIVE U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s. FOR THAT REASON, I AM TEMPTED THIS MORNING TO BITE MY TONGUE AND DUCK THE CENTRAL ISSUES THAT HAVE BROUGHT ALL OF US TOGETHER THIS WEEK.

BUT I CAN'T DO THAT; AND I WON'T. THE FACT IS THAT THE GROUND IS SHIFTING UNDERNEATH OUR DEFENSE POLICY, IN THE PACIFIC AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. SINCE WORLD WAR II, OUR APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY HAS PREVENTED NUCLEAR CONFLAGRATION; THIS APPROACH HAS RESISTED, CONTAINED, AND EVEN BEGUN TO ROLL BACK AN AGGRESSIVE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT THAT TOOK ADVANTAGE OF POST-COLONIAL RESENTMENTS AND VULNERABILITIES THROUGHOUT THE THIRD WORLD. OUR POST-WAR APPROACH HAS GAINED US THE CONFIDENCE, TRUST, AND PRECIOUS GOODWILL OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS ON EVERY CONTINENT.

AND TODAY, OUR TRADITIONAL ADVERSARY, THE SOVIET UNION, IS OUTDOING ITSELF TRYING TO PROJECT THE VERY IMAGE OF CIVILITY, BENEVOLENCE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD FOUGHT TO PRESERVE FOR SO LONG AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. TODAY, FEARS OF SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD -- AN OVERRIDING INTERNATIONAL CONCERN TEN SHORT YEARS AGO -- ARE DISSIPATING AS THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM IMPROVE IN AFGHANISTAN, SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE PERSIAN GULF, CAMBODIA, THE MAGHREB, AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA. TODAY, ALMOST NO ONE FEARS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND FREE MARKET ECONOMICS.

WE HAVE A WORD FOR ALL THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE: SUCCESS. VIRTUALLY EVERYONE IN THIS ROOM CAN CLAIM A MEASURE OF CREDIT FOR THE SUCCESS OF OUR POST-WAR DEFENSE POLICY. THAT IS WHY I DARESAY THAT EVERYONE IN THIS ROOM WILL KNOW WHAT I AM TALKING ABOUT WHEN I SAY THE GROUND IS SHIFTING BENEATH OUR FEET: TO PUT IT BLUNTLY, WE ARE LOSING THE POPULAR CONSENSUS TO SUSTAIN AN ENGAGED DEFENSE POLICY ABROAD.

OTHER CONFEREES WILL PRESENT THE LATEST INFORMATION ON PROGRAM CUTS, EARMARKS, BURDENSARING EFFORTS, AND OTHER LEGISLATIVE MEASURES AFFECTING THE WAY WE DO OUR BUSINESS. MY INTENTION IS TO LOOK AT THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO THE LARGER, OVERRIDING ISSUE OF OUR NATIONAL PURPOSE IN SUSTAINING A MAJOR DEFENSE EFFORT IN THE PACIFIC.

PUBLIC OPINION IS FUNNY. FOR MANY YEARS, OUR PRESIDENTS HAVE BEEN SUPPORTED WITH ADEQUATE FUNDING AND FREEDOM OF ACTION TO PURSUE A BROAD ARRAY OF SECURITY GOALS THROUGHOUT THE THIRD WORLD -- SOME GEOPOLITICAL, SOME REGIONAL, AND OTHERS VERY LOCAL IN NATURE. WHY? BECAUSE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SAW A GLOBAL THREAT TO THEIR INTERESTS EMANATING MAINLY FROM THE SOVIET UNION. NOW, THE TABLES HAVE TURNED. AT A TIME WHEN OUR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL WELFARE MAY BE MORE CLOSELY INTERCONNECTED WITH THE THIRD WORLD THAN EVER, AND THE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD -- FROM EMERGING NEW POWERS AS WELL AS FROM THE SOVIETS -- IS MORE CHALLENGING THAN EVER, OUR RESOURCES AND POLICY FLEXIBILITY ARE EVAPORATING. WHY? BECAUSE THE PUBLIC'S FEAR OF SOVIET AGGRESSION IS EVAPORATING.

IT IS NO GREAT MYSTERY WHY SO MANY AMERICANS AND, INDEED, SO MUCH OF THE WORLD, ARE APPARENTLY DELIGHTED TO WARM UP TO MR. GORBACHEV. MOST PEOPLE NEVER SEE A PACIFIC AREA UPDATE, AND THEY DO NOT REALIZE THAT THE SWORD OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN ASIA HAS YET TO BE TURNED INTO THE PLOWSHARE OF PERESTROIKA. NEVERTHELESS, GIVE MR. GORBACHEV SOME CREDIT. IN TRYING TO DISENTANGLE HIS BANKRUPT EMPIRE FROM THE DEBILITATING BREZHNEV-ERA COMMITMENTS HE INHERITED, HE HAS HELPED TO REDUCE WORLD TENSIONS. THIS HAS MADE THE SOVIETS MORE POPULAR, AND, IF THE PEACE PARADE CONTINUES, MAY MAKE THEM A LOT MORE POPULAR IN THE 1990s. ONE IS TEMPTED TO USE THE OLD ADAGE THAT NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE FAILURE.

BUT WHAT ABOUT THE UNITED STATES, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR OUR INFLUENCE INTERNATIONALLY IN THE 1990s? CAN IT BE THAT NOTHING FAILS LIKE SUCCESS?

LOOK AT THE ROLE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS IN IMPORTANT FRIENDLY COUNTRIES LIKE THAILAND AND INDONESIA. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE DIDN'T ESTABLISH THOSE ORGANIZATIONS, AND LIE, CHEAT AND STEAL TO GET SOME OF OUR NATION'S MOST TALENTED MILITARY PROFESSIONALS TO MAN THEM, ONLY TO HAVE THEM BECOME BAD NEWS MESSENGERS YEAR AFTER YEAR -- SYMBOLS OF WHAT MANY OF OUR ASIAN PARTNERS BELIEVE IS DECLINING AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND SOME EVEN FEAR MAY BE THE BEGINNING OF AN HISTORIC STRATEGIC RETRENCHMENT BY THE UNITED STATES.

LOOK AT THE BURDENSARING ISSUE. I THINK WE CAN ALL IDENTIFY AREAS WHERE OUR SECURITY PARTNERS COULD DO MORE TO SUPPORT SHARED SECURITY OBJECTIVES. BUT THE BEAUTY OF OUR ALLIANCES -- THEIR SUCCESS -- MAY ALSO TURN OUT TO BE THEIR BANE, SO TO SPEAK. THANKS TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR JOINT DEFENSES, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS FLOWERED, POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, RIGHT UNDER THE GUNS OF THE HOSTILE NORTH. JAPAN HAS ANSWERED OUR POST-WAR WISHES AND DEVELOPED INTO A STABLE, NON-AGGRESSIVE, PRO-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY WHOSE ONLY MAJOR SIN IS THAT IT DOES EVERYTHING SO WELL.

OUR PACIFIC ALLIANCES HAVE WORKED -- IN JAPAN, IN KOREA, AND IN AUSTRALIA, THAILAND, AND THE PHILIPPINES AS WELL.

STABILITY HAS BRED PROSPERITY. SECURITY HAS BRED POLITICAL PLURALISM. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NEVER USED TO QUESTION THE NEED TO JOIN WITH THESE PARTNERS TO RESIST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, EVEN IF OUR FORCES CARRIED THE LION'S SHARE OF THE BURDEN OF DETERRENCE.

NOW, THINGS ARE DIFFERENT. AMERICA'S PARTNERS ARE NOT SO POOR, WEAK, AND VULNERABLE; AND THEY HAVE MINDS OF THEIR OWN. THEIR GOVERNMENTS ANSWER NOT TO UNCLE SAM, BUT TO THEIR OWN LEGISLATURES, INDUSTRIAL INTERESTS, EDITORIAL WRITERS AND SOMETIMES NATIONALISTIC VOTERS. SOUNDS A LOT LIKE AMERICA. IS THAT SO BAD?

APPARENTLY IT IS TO SOME IN WASHINGTON WHO SEEM TO THINK THAT GREATLY EXPANDED JAPANESE FORCES COULD SUBSTITUTE FOR OUR OWN PRESENCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA WITHOUT SO MUCH AS RUFFLING ANY FEATHERS, MUCH LESS CONSUMING THE CHINESE, SOVIETS, KOREANS, SOUTHEAST ASIANS AND THE JAPANESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES IN A SPIRAL OF TENSION AND ESCALATION.

APPARENTLY IT IS TO SOME WHO INTERPRET PRESIDENT ROH TAE WOO'S NORDPOLITIK AND SOUTH KOREA'S ECONOMIC PROGRESS AS A SIGNAL THAT OUR FORCES ARE NO LONGER NEEDED TO PRESERVE PEACE ON THE PENINSULA.

THE "BURDENSARING INITIATIVE" SEEMED LIKE A GOOD IDEA TO MANY LAWMAKERS IN THAT IT SOUGHT TO ELICIT GREATER SUPPORT

FOR COMMON SECURITY OBJECTIVES FROM ALLIES WHO COULD AFFORD TO DO MORE. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT, IN THE END, AMERICA'S EVER-STRONGER ALLIES WOULD HAVE RAISED THEIR LEVEL OF SUPPORT IN SOME MANNER AND, IN THE END, AMERICA'S ALLIANCES WOULD BE THE STRONGER FOR IT.

BUT THERE'S THE RUB: WHERE IS THE END? AT WHAT POINT IS "MORE" ENOUGH? IF WE LOSE SIGHT OF THAT, I SUBMIT THAT WE HAVE LOST SIGHT OF THE BOTTOM LINE, WHICH IS TO END UP WITH BETTER, STRONGER ALLIANCES. WHEN 1995 ROLLS AROUND, WILL THERE STILL BE A BURDENSARING INITIATIVE? WILL WE HAVE AN AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR BURDENSARING, AS THE CONGRESS HAS MANDATED, REPORTING BACK TO THE SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEES ON BURDENSARING?

IF THE ANSWER IS "YES," THIS CAN ONLY MEAN ONE OF TWO THINGS: EITHER OUR ALLIES WILL HAVE UTTERLY FAILED TO TAKE ON A SATISFACTORY MEASURE OF THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL OR SOCIAL COSTS OF ALLIANCE, DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS; OR THEY WILL HAVE TAKEN SUCH STEPS BUT RECEIVED NO CREDIT FOR IT IN WASHINGTON. EITHER WAY, IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW OUR ALLIANCES CAN BECOME STRONGER IF WE INSTITUTIONALIZE A PERMANENT MESSAGE OF DISHARMONY AND DISSATISFACTION WITH OUR PARTNERS. WE MAY ACTUALLY GET FEWER RESULTS IF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN MAKING ADDITIONAL SACRIFICES BECAUSE, FROM THEIR READING OF WASHINGTON, IT WILL NEVER BE ENOUGH.

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SO, WHERE ARE WE HEADED IN THE 1990s? OUR MISSION IN THE PACIFIC SHOULD NOT BE VERY DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE. WE NEED TO DO MORE OF WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING IN RECENT YEARS, SO THAT TODAY'S POSITIVE TRENDS CAN BE CARRIED THROUGH TO BECOME FULL-BLOWN SUCCESSES. WE NEED TO STAY PUT, AND TO BE PATIENT.

THE SOVIET PRESIDENT HAS TALKED OF "NEW THINKING" IN ASIA, AND SUGGESTED MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSIONS. WHY SHOULD WE TAKE PRECIPITOUS ACTIONS THAT MIGHT TEMPT KREMLIN HARDLINERS TO REVERT TO MILITARY INDIMIDATION BEFORE WE HAVE GIVEN MR. GORBACHEV A CHANCE TO BACK UP HIS MODERATE WORDS WITH DEEDS?

FOR EXAMPLE, WHY SHOULD WE DISTURB THE DELICATE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA BY TAKING UNILATERAL MEASURES WHICH COULD CALL INTO QUESTION FOUR DECADES OF COMMITMENT BY THE UNITED STATES? AGAIN, I DO NOT KNOW; BUT CONGRESS IS SENDING JUST SUCH A SIGNAL BY IMPOSING STATUTORY CEILINGS ON U.S. TROOPS DEPLOYED IN BOTH THE ROK AND JAPAN.

IN CAMBODIA, WHY SHOULD WE RELIEVE THE PRESSURES ON THE SOVIETS AND VIETNAMESE, BEFORE VIETNAM HAS WITHDRAWN ALL ITS FORCES AND THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK HAVE FREED THEIR COUNTRY FROM THE TYRANNY OF VIETNAMESE AND KHMER ROUGE ALIKE? THE ANSWER IS SIMPLE. WE SHOULD NOT LET UP THE PRESSURE.

FORTUNATELY, IN THE PHILIPPINES, OUR POLICY DOES APPEAR TO BENEFIT FROM A SOLID POLITICAL CONSENSUS WHICH RECOGNIZES THAT U.S. INTERESTS WILL BE SERVED BY THE SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY. THE PHILIPPINES MULTILATERAL AID INITIATIVE IS A TRULY CONTEMPORARY CONCEPT, WHICH LEVERAGES U.S. AID INVESTMENT INTO SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ASSISTANCE FROM MANY SOURCES TO REBUILD THE PHILIPPINES.

WE WOULD DO WELL TO APPLY THE ENLIGHTENED LOGIC OF THE PHILIPPINE MAI TO THE REST OF OUR PACIFIC SECURITY STRATEGY. IN TIMES OF TIGHT BUDGETS, WE WILL NEED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH OTHER LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES, SUCH AS JAPAN, TO COMBINE OUR VARIOUS TALENTS AND RESOURCES IN A SENSIBLE KIND OF PEACE-TIME BURDENSARING WHICH CONTINUES TO PROMOTE STABILITY AND MAINTAINS THE POSITIVE MOMENTUM OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGHOUT THE REGION.

I AM REMINDED OF MY OWN EXPERIENCE A FEW YEARS AGO IN WORKING TO ESTABLISH THE WAR RESERVE STOCKPILE PROGRAM WITH THAILAND. BOTH THE U.S. AND THAILAND HAD LIMITED RESOURCES, IN TERMS OF MATERIEL, FUNDING AND PERSONNEL, TO COMMIT TO SUCH A VENTURE. HOWEVER, WE WERE ABLE TO FASHION AN APPROACH LEADING TOWARD A SUBSTANTIAL WAR RESERVE CAPABILITY WITHOUT OVERTAXING EITHER PARTNER, AND WITHOUT IT BEING A HAND-OUT FROM ONE TO THE OTHER. I THINK BOTH ALLIES HAVE BENEFITED.

IT'S TOO BAD WE HAVE TO SPEAK OF USING THESE INNOVATIVE SECURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVES TO SALVAGE OUR PACIFIC DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS -- BUT THIS IS WHERE WE FIND OURSELVES AS THE POPULAR CONSENSUS BEHIND THE POLICY DWINDLES. EVEN A NO-COST TECHNOLOGY-SHARING PROGRAM, SUCH AS THE FSX CO-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITH JAPAN IS, APPARENTLY, TOO INNOVATIVE FOR SOME CRITICS IN WASHINGTON WHO HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WILL OPPOSE PRESIDENT BUSH IF HE GOES FORWARD WITH IT.

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WHEN THE NATIONAL STRATEGY REVIEWS ARE DONE AND THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE HIS DECISIONS, WE NEED TO EXPLAIN TO THE PUBLIC WHAT KIND OF A WORLD WE WILL FACE IN THE 1990s -- WHAT IS CHANGING AND WHY; WHAT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AND HOW THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED; AND WHAT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS WE SHOULD BE SUPPORTING TO PROTECT THOSE INTERESTS.

ONLY THEN WILL THE PUBLIC UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY AGAINST ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES HAS STEADILY RISEN EVEN WHILE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE TALKED OF PEACE, TRADE AND ARMS CONTROL.

ONLY THEN WILL THE PUBLIC REALIZE THAT THE U.S. FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA ARE NOT SOME FAVOR WE DO FOR OTHER STATES WHICH NO LONGER NEED OR DESERVE TO BE DEFENDED; BUT THEY ARE THE CENTERPIECE, THE LYNCHPIN OF A COLLECTIVE SECURITY STRATEGY

WHICH IS TRANSFORMING AN HISTORICALLY VOLATILE REGION INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY'S ENGINE OF DEMOCRACY AND A ZONE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO U.S. ECONOMIC PROSPERITY -- THAT IS, SO LONG AS WE DON'T PULL THE PLUG ON IT.

ONLY THEN WILL THE PUBLIC KNOW THAT THE WAY TO KEEP THE SOVIET UNION FROM EVENTUALLY GAINING THROUGH WARM WORDS THE KIND OF LEVERAGE OVER FREE PEOPLES IT FAILED TO GAIN THROUGH INTIMIDATION IS BY SEEKING TO RETAIN INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE OURSELVES.

IN FACT, MAINTAINING INFLUENCE THROUGH OUR KEY DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS MAY WELL HOLD THE KEY TO OUR ABILITY AS A NATION TO GUARD AGAINST A WIDE ARRAY OF THREATS TO OUR SECURITY. WE WILL NOT BE WELL POSITIONED TO CURB THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES, NOR TO GAIN EFFECTIVE COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM, DRUGS, THE SPREAD OF AIDS, AND MANY OTHER SUCH SECURITY THREATS OF THE 1990s, IF WE CONTINUE TO DEAL OURSELVES OUT OF THE GAME.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT YOUR MISSION IS AND WILL REMAIN CRUCIAL IN PROTECTING U.S. INTERESTS DURING WHAT SOME PEOPLE CALL THE "VIOLENT PEACE." IN AN ERA WHEN ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES MAY BE INTRODUCED IN A THIRD WORLD CRISIS BY ANY OF A NUMBER OF STATES, WE NEED GOOD DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS. WE MAY NEED ACCESS FOR OUR OWN FORCES, AND WE MAY DEPEND ON INTEROPERABILITY WITH FRIENDLY FORCES.

RELATIONSHIPS LIKE THESE TAKE YEARS TO DEVELOP. AS WE CUT BACK OUR PROGRAMS FROM WASHINGTON, I FEAR THEY MAY BE FAR MORE QUICKLY LOST. THERE IS NO SHORTAGE OF ALTERNATIVE ARMS SUPPLIERS; AND NO OTHER COUNTRY, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, TREATS ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN ADJUNCT TO A PRINCIPLED, RESPONSIBLE POLICY.

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IN SUM, YOU'VE GOT YOUR WORK CUT OUT FOR YOU. YOU HAVE ALL CONTRIBUTED TO A DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS IN THE PACIFIC. YOU HAVE DONE SO WELL THAT MANY AMERICANS NO LONGER SEE MUCH POINT IN SUSTAINING THIS POLICY. WHAT'S MISSING IS A RECOGNITION THAT THE BRIGHT FUTURE WE ANTICIPATE FOR U.S. INTERESTS IN ASIA WILL COME ABOUT BECAUSE OF THOSE POLICY COMMITMENTS, NOT IN SPITE OF THEM. INDEED, THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MISSION MAY BE MORE RELEVANT TO THE PURSUIT OF OUR SECURITY AGENDA FIVE YEARS FROM NOW THAN IT WAS FIVE YEARS AGO, BEFORE THE PROGRAM CUTTING BEGAN IN EARNEST.

OUR PACIFIC SAOs HAVE ALL THE MISSION THEY NEED FOR THE 1990s. AS YOU GO ABOUT YOUR IMPORTANT DELIBERATIONS THIS WEEK, I HOPE YOU WILL ALL KEEP IN MIND THAT THE BENEFICIAL THINGS YOU DO FOR YOUR COUNTRY WILL NEED TO BE MADE A LOT MORE CLEAR TO THE FOLKS BACK HOME. WE HAVE A GOOD STORY TO TELL. NOW, WE HAD BETTER START TELLING IT, IF WE ARE TO

RECAPTURE THE SUPPORT WE NEED TO MAKE THE MOST OF THESE
RELATIONSHIPS AND TO BUILD ON THE TREMENDOUS SUCCESS WE AND
OUR ALLIES HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT IN THE PACIFIC.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.